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The goal of this chapter, together with the next one, is to give a detailed
overview of the proof of the following result.
Theorem 1 Let Γ be a two-player stochastic game with ￿nite action and
states sets. The game Γ has a uniform equilibrium payoﬀ.
The complete proof is to be found in Vieille [4],[5]. The general idea of
the proof is to de￿ne a class of sets, the solvable sets, which can safely be
thought of as absorbing states, and to construct ε-equilibrium pro￿les such
that the induced play reaches one of these sets with high probability, and
remains there.
Solvable sets are de￿n e di nS e c t i o n1 . T h eo r g a n i z a t i o no ft h ep r o o fi s
presented in Section 2. We shall use the tools introduced in a chapter by
Solan [2].
1S o l v a b l e s t a t e s
Let (α,β) be a stationary pro￿le, and C ⊆ S be a weakly communicating set
for (α,β).D e n o t e b y R the collection of ergodic sets for (α,β),w h i c ha r e
subsets of C, and, for R ∈ R,s e tγ(R,α,β) = limn γn(z,α,β),w h e r ez ∈ R.
The limit exists and is independent of z.
De￿nition 2 (C,(α,β)) is solvable if, for some distribution ￿ on R,o n e









and a symmetric property for player 2.
1This concept is a slight generalization of the concept of easy initial states,
introduced by Vrieze and Thuijsman.
Here, βz stands for the z-component of β.T h eq u a n t i t y
P
R∈R ￿(R)γ(R,α,β)
is called the solvable payoﬀ on C. In words, there is one convex combination
of the average payoﬀs on ergodic sets, that is individually rational, in the
sense that it is at least the expected level of punishment, given any one-stage
deviation of either player.
When no confusion may arise, we will omit (α,β), and speak of solvable
sets.
Solvable sets do exist (see Thuijsman and Vrieze [3] or Vieille [?]f o rt w o
players, Vieille [6] for a generalization to N player-games).
Lemma 3 Let C be solvable. The solvable payoﬀ on C is an equilibrium
payoﬀ, when the initial state belongs to C.
Corresponding ε-equilibrium strategies are designed as follows: (α,β) is
perturbed (in an history-dependent way) in such a way that the induced play
remains in C, visits in￿nitely many times each R ∈ R, and the average payoﬀ
γn(z1,α,β) is close to the solvable payoﬀ.T h i sp r o ￿le is sustained by threats.
Remark 4 for the existence of solvable states, and for this lemma to hold,
the assumption of perfect monitoring can be weakened. One may only assume
that states and payoﬀs are known to the players
Replace each state z which belongs to some solvable set C by an absorbing
state, which receives as payoﬀ the solvable payoﬀ of C (which speci￿cp a y o ﬀ is
chosen for a state which belongs to several solvable sets is of no importance).
It is not diﬃcult to check that, for the simpli￿ed game, solvable sets coincide
with absorbing states. Moreover, equilibrium payoﬀso ft h esimpli￿ed game
are equilibrium payoﬀso ft h eoriginal game.
Therefore, since we deal with the existence issue, we might and do assume
that the only solvable sets of the game we are dealing with are absorbing
states.
We denote by S∗ ⊆ S the subset of non-absorbing states. For simplicity,
we assume r1(•) < 0 <r 2(•).A n ε-equilibrium pro￿le (σ,τ) is absorbing if
the probability of reaching an absorbing state in ￿nite time is at least 1−ε,
whatever be the initial state.
22O v e r v i e w
Let Γ be a game. We start with a preliminary observation. Let C ⊆ S∗,a n d
Q an exit distribution from C, that is controllable for any payoﬀ vector γ ≥ v
(we refer to such a pair as a controlled set). Replace C by a dummy state, in
which transitions are given by Q (and payoﬀs are arbitrary). The resulting
game ΓC is called reduced. A crucial consequence of the controllability notion
is that, if ΓC has an absorbing ε-equilibrium for each ε,s od o e sΓ.As i m i l a r
reduction can be done for a family C of disjoint controlled sets. To avoid
confusion, all objects related to ΓC are indexed by C.
We now ￿x the agenda. We ￿rst construct a (possibly empty) family
of disjoint controlled sets C, such that the reduced game ΓC is nice, in a
sense to be made precise. The properties of ΓC enables one to construct
an auxiliary recursive game (with speci￿cf e a t u r e sF), such that: any ab-
sorbing ε-equilibrium pro￿le of this auxiliary recursive game is an absorbing
ε-equilibrium pro￿le of the reduced game (provided one adds one simple
threat). The ￿nal step is the proof that recursive games with features F do
have absorbing ε-equilibrium pro￿les.
L e tu sb em o r es p e c i ￿c.
De￿nition 5 Ap a i r(β,D),w h e r eD ⊆ S∗, is a blocking pair for player 1
if for each z ∈ D,a ∈ A,
n










We also de￿ne blocking pairs (α,D) f o rp l a y e r2b ye x c h a n g i n gt h er o l e s
of the two players. We extend this de￿nition to games obtained by reducing
Γ.
De￿nition 6 Let (C1,...,CM) be disjoint controlled sets. A pair (β,D),
where D ⊆ S∗
C, is a reduced blocking pair for player 1 if for each z ∈ D,a ∈ A,
n










We stress the fact that the value v1 that is used is the value associated
with the original game, and not the value v1
C of the reduced game.1 There is
no relation between reduced blocking pairs and blocking pairs of the reduced
game.
1There is no speci￿c relation between v and vC.I np a r t i c u l a r ,vC may depend on the
choice of the payoﬀ in the dummy states which replace the controlled sets.
3Remark 7 It is not crucial to de￿ne reduced blocking pairs using EC rather
than E.Our results and proofs would remain valid if De￿nition 6 was modi￿ed
accordingly.
Remark 8 The set S∗
C which appears in De￿nition 6 is the state space of the
reduced game ΓC. For simplicity, we shall not distinguish between S∗
C and S∗,
in that we shall identify any subset of S∗
C to the corresponding subset of S∗.
One may wonder why reduced games are not de￿ned by replacing each state
in a given controlled set by a diﬀerent state. The reason is the following.
Let D be a controlled set, and replace each state in D by a dummy state as
suggested. Then it may well be the case that communicating sets exist in the
resulting game, which contain some but not all of the states of D. This would
create many small complications. This phenomenon does of course not arise
with our de￿nition.
Propositions 9, 10 and 11 below imply Theorem 1
Proposition 9 There is a collection C of disjoint controlled sets such that
there is no reduced blocking pair for player 2.
Of course, there is nothing speci￿c about player 2. The same result holds
with player 1 instead.
Let e Γ be the game obtained from ΓC by setting the payoﬀ function in
non-absorbing states to zero.
The game e Γ is recursive and has the following features F:
￿ all absorbing payoﬀs of player 2 (resp. of player 1.) are positive (resp.
negative).
￿ for every α, there exists β, such that (α,β) is absorbing.
Proposition 10 If e Γ has an equilibrium payoﬀ,t h eg a m eΓC has an absorb-
ing ε-equilibrium pro￿le, for every ε.
Proposition 11 Every recursive game with features F has an equilibrium
payoﬀ.
The proof of Proposition 11 is presented in the next chapter.
43T h e r e d u c t i o n
We prove Proposition 10. The construction of controlled sets is done in two
steps. It is elementary, except for one point. We give the idea, discuss in
more detail the delicate issue, and brie￿y explain how to implement the idea.
3.1 The idea
We start with a crucial observation. Denote by αλ an optimal strategy of






for every z, β.D e n o t e b y α = limλ→0 αλ (the limit is taken up to a








1(z), for every z,β.
Lemma 12 Let (α,D) be a blocking pair for player 2. There exists D v D,
such that: (i) v2 is constant on D; (ii) D is communicating under (α,β);
(iii) (α,D) is a blocking pair for player 2.
Proof. De￿ne e D to be those states in D where v2 is maximal. Clearly,
(α, e D) is a blocking pair for player 2. In particular, e D is stable for (α,β).
Consider the subsets of e D which are maximal for the (weak) communication
property. At least one of them will do.
The previous lemma gives the clue to the reduction algorithm. Given any
blocking pair (α,D) f o rp l a y e r2 ,t a k eD as in the previous lemma.
￿ If it is the case that p(D|z,a,β) < 1 and E(v1|z,a,β) ≥ maxD v1,f o r
some z ∈ D,a ∈ A,t h e nD is a controlled set. Indeed, choose among
those pairs a pair (z∗,a ∗) which maximizes E(v1|z,a,β). The exit dis-
tribution p(•|z∗,a ∗,β) from D is controllable (for every continuation
payoﬀ vector γ ≥ v).
￿ Otherwise, (β,D) is a blocking pair for player 1. One may then repeat
the previous argument, with the two players exchanged. Take a set
D ⊆ D, as given by the previous lemma (where the two players are
exchanged). Therefore,
5￿ either the exit distribution p(•|z∗,α,b ∗) from D is controllable, for
some pair (z∗,b ∗) ∈ S∗ ￿ B,
￿ or (α,D) is a blocking pair for player 2.
In the latter case, notice that (α,D) is a blocking pair for player 2 and
(β,D) is a blocking pair for player 1. The handling of such a case is more
delicate. We use a by-product of Mertens-Neyman value existence proof to
conclude that D is solvable, or that there is a controllable exit distribution
from D, based on joint perturbations of the two players. Since we have ruled
out non-absorbing solvable sets, D is a controlled set.
Therefore, roughly speaking, any blocking pair contains a controlled set,
moreover of a simple type.
3.2 The diﬃcult step
We deal here with the part of the idea that has been isolated. Let D ⊆ S∗
be a communicating set for (α,β), and such that both (α,D) and (β,D) are
blocking pairs. We intend to prove that, given D is not solvable, there is
some controllable exit distribution from D. 2
The idea above uses only the subharmonic properties of v1 (resp. of v2)
with respect to the kernel p(•|z,α,β) (resp. p(•|z,α,β)). Notice that the
notion of controlled set involves the payoﬀ function in a quite tangent way,
since it appears only through v1 (or v2) ,w h e r e a si ti so fc o u r s eq u i t ec e n t r a l
in the notion of solvable set. Therefore, it is obvious that this part of the
proof will use arguments of a completely diﬀerent nature.
It is convenient, and not restrictive, to assume that p(D|z,a,b)=0if
p(D|z,a,b) < 1.
3.2.1 Reminder on ε-optimal strategies
We start by pointing out a crucial by-product of Mertens-Neyman value
existence proof. Let (αλ)λ≤λ0 and (β￿)￿≤￿0 be one-parameter families of















2I know no example of such a set B. Any such set has to contain at least two ergodic
sets for (α,β).
6Then, for every ε > 0,t h e r ei sas t r a t e g yσ which after any history plays like
some αλ: σ(hn)=α
λ(hn)
zn , that has the following property. For any strategy




1(z) − ε,f o rn large enough.
Moreover, the same result holds in every subgame: for every hp, one has
E[g1
n|hp] ≥ v1(zp) − ε,p r o v i d e dn is large (where zp is the terminal state of
hp).
Observe ￿nally that if the property 1 holds for λ0, it also holds for the
subfamily (αλ)λ≤λ0, for every λ0 ≤ λ0. One may therefore require in addition
that λ(hn) be close to zero, for every hn.
3.2.2 Application
In Mertens-Neyman￿s proof, αλ is an optimal strategy of player 1 in the λ-
discounted zero-sum game, and there is no restriction on the set of strategies
of player 2.
Let us de￿ne αλ as follows. Denote by (αλ) optimal strategies of player
1i nt h eλ-discounted games such that limλ αλ = α.F o r z ∈ D,d e n o t e
Az = {a ∈ A, p(D|z,a,βz)=1}, and de￿ne αλ
z as αλ
z, conditioned on Az.
De￿ne β￿ symmetrically. The following facts are easy to prove:
￿ limλ αλ = α,a n dlim￿ β￿ = β.
￿ for every z, the inequality (1) holds, together with the symmetric coun-
terpart for player 2, provided λ and ￿ are close enough to zero.
This has the following consequence. Let ε > 0. Provided ε is small enough,
we can assume that the inequality (1), and its counterpart for player 2, hold
for every λ,￿<ε,a n dt h a tm o r e o v e r||αλ − α||,||β￿ − β|| < ε.
Replace the states z outside D by absorbing states, with payoﬀ v(z)+ε.
In this new game, there exists a pro￿le (σε,τε) of strategies, such that:
1. for every history hn, ||σε(hn) − αzn||,||τε(hn) − βzn|| < ε.
2. γn(z,σε,τε) ≥ v(z)−ε,f o rn large, and the same holds in any subgame.3
3In this inequality, γn(z,σε,τε) stands for the average payoﬀ in the new game, and v(z)
for the value in the original game. We use here the easy observation that the value of the
n e wg a m ei sa tl e a s tt h ev a l u eo ft h eo r i g i n a lg a m e .
7Denote by pε the probability that, starting from z, under (σε,τε),t h ep l a y
ever leaves D (i.e., reaches an absorbing state). We discuss according to the
asymptotic behavior of pε,f o rε small.
CASE 1: there is a sequence (εn) converging to zero, with pεn = 1 for
every n.
We argue that there is a controllable exit distribution from D.L e tε be-
long to the sequence, and denote by Qε the distribution (starting from z,u n -
der (σε,τε))o ft h ee x i ts t a t ef r o mD.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,p(D|zn,σε(hn),βzn)=
1 = p(D|zn,αzn,τε(hn)), for every history hn.T h u s , Qε belongs to the set
which was denoted Q2(α,β) in the previous chapter by Solan: Qε is in the
convex hull of the distributions p(•|z,a,b),w h e r e(z,a,b) ∈ D ￿ A ￿ B,a n d
p(D|z,a,βz)=p(D|a,αz,b)=1.N o t i c et h a t
lim
n γn(z,σε,τε)=Qεv + ε.
Therefore, Qεv ≥ v(z)−ε. Since Q2(α,β) is compact, there is a distribution
Q ∈ Q2(α,β) with Qv ≥ v(z).
Since Q involves no unilateral exits, and both pairs (α,D) and (β,D) are
blocking, one concludes that the exit Q is controllable (with respect to any
γ ≥ v).
CASE 2: there is a sequence (εn) converging to zero, with pεn < 1,f o r
every n.
We argue that D is solvable. Denote by R the set of ergodic sets for
(α,β), which are included in D.C h o o s e a n y ε such that pε < 1.C o n s i d e r
any subgame (i.e. any history hp) in which the probability of reaching an
absorbing state in ￿nite time is close to 0. Denote by γn(hp,σε,τε) the average
payoﬀ induced by (σε,τε) i nt h es u b g a m ed e ￿ned by hp.S i n c e σε and τε
always play approximately like α and β, the average payoﬀ γn(hp,σε,τε) is,
for n large, close to some convex distribution of the payoﬀ vectors γ(R,α,β),
R ∈ R. How close it is depends on ε. Since this is true for every ε, and since
t h ec o n v e xh u l lo f{γ(R,α,β),R∈ R} is compact, there is some point d in
this convex hull, with d ≥ v.
Since D communicates under (α,β), and both pairs (α,D) and (β,D) are
blocking, one concludes that D is solvable.
83.3 The algorithm
When one tries to turn the above idea into a proof, one runs into some trou-
bles. One may have to ￿nd, iteratively, controlled sets within blocking sets.
After the ￿rst round, one needs to apply the above idea to a reduced game.
As mentioned above, the pivotal point in the proof is the above-mentioned
by-product of Mertens-Neyman￿s proof, wich enables to relate assumptions
on transitions (the fact that (α,D) and (β,D) are blocking pairs) to prop-
erties of average payoﬀs (solvable set). The corresponding would be quite
cumbersome.
Therefore; we reverse the argument and proceed in two steps as follows:
STEP 1 : let (D1,...,D M) be the maximal subsets of S∗ with the fol-
lowing properties, for every m:
￿ v is constant on Dm;
￿ Dm communicates for (α,β);
￿ (β,D m) is a blocking pair for player 1.
The sets (Dm) are disjoint. Moreover, the family (Dm) is uniquely de￿ned
(given the choice of (α,β)).
For each m, there is a controllable exit distribution from Dm, based on
perturbations of (α,β), as was shown above. Choose any such exit distribu-
tion. The following lemma is a simple consequence of the fact that the sets
Dm were chosen maximal.
Lemma 13 Consider the reduced game Γ(D1,..,DM).T h e r ei sn os e tD,s u c h
that (β,D) is a reduced blocking pair for player 1.
Proof. Assume such a D exists. It is easy to check that there is a subset
e D of D such that v2 is constant on e D 4 and (β, e D) is a reduced blocking pair
for player 1. A variation on Lemma 12 shows that there exists a subset D
of e D such that v is constant on D and (β,D) is a reduced blocking pair. It
is then clearly a blocking pair for player 1 in the original game Γ (one here
identi￿es D to a subset of S∗). Of course, D cannot coincide with a single
Dm (it would not be stable in the reduced game otherwise). Therefore, either
4Since B is a subset of S∗
(B1,..,BM),w em a yh a v et os p e a ko fv(bi),w h e r ebi is the
dummy state which stands for Bi.W es e tvj(bi)=m a x Bi vj,f o rj =1 ,2.
9D strictly contains some Dm, or is disjoint from them. In both cases, this
contradicts the de￿nition of the sets D1,...,D M.
STEP 2: let (C1,...,CL) be subsets of S∗
(D1,...,DM), with the following
properties, for every l:
1. v2 is constant on Cl;
2. for some αl,C l is communicating for (αl,β) and (αl,C l) is a reduced
blocking pair for player 2.
We need an equivalent of the maximality assumption used in STEP 1.
We add the requirement that, for every l ∈ {1,...,L},C l is a maximal subset
of S∗ÂC1 ∪ C2... ∪ Cl−1with the properties 1 and 2 (and there is no subset
of S∗ÂC1 ∪ C2... ∪ CL with properties 1 and 2).
The fact that the family (C1,...,CL) is not uniquely de￿ned is not im-
portant. By STEP 1, none of the pairs (Cl,β) is a reduced blocking pair for
player 1. This implies that none of the pairs (Cl,β) is a blocking pair for
player 1.Therefore, the exit distribution p(•|zi,a l;β) from Cl is controllable,
for some zl ∈ Cl,a∈ A.
As in STEP 1, the next lemma is a consequence of the maximality prop-
erty of the sets (Cl). Its proof is an adaptation of the proof of Lemma 13.
Lemma 14 Consider the reduced game (Γ(D1,...,DM))(C1,...,CL). There is no re-
duced blocking pair for player 2.
4 Reduced games and recursive games
It remains to prove Proposition 10. The proof relies on the fact that, in the
reduced game that we obtained, there is an individually rational, absorbing
reply of player 2 to any given α. This fact relies itself on the idea that the
reduction eliminated all blocking pairs for player 2.
Lemma 15 The following is true for the reduced game ΓC. For every α,t h e r e
exists β such that the pro￿le (α,β) is absorbing and γ2(z,α,β) ≥ v2(z).
We stress once more the fact that v2 is the value associated to the original
game Γ.









and notice that EC [v2|z,a,b] ≥ E [v2|z,a,b],f o re v e r y(z,a,b).
We now prove Proposition 10.
Proof. any ε-equilibrium (σ,τ) of e Γ is absorbing. Choose an integer N
such that, under (σ,τ), an absorbing state is reached before stage N,w i t h
high probability. Then the pro￿le which plays (σ,τ) up to stage N,a n d
punishments strategies afterwards, is an absorbing ε0-equilibrium, where ε0
goes to zero with ε.5
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